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FUNDAMENTAL PROTECTION OF A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT: FULL RECOVERY OF CHILD-REARING
DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL PREGNANCY
Patricia Baugher
Abstract: The U. S. Constitution and Washington statutes protect the right to choose not to
have a child as a fundamental right. When a healthy child is born after contraceptive methods
fail due to physician negligence, parents can sue on a "wrongful pregnancy" cause of action.
In all jurisdictions recognizing wrongful pregnancy, parents may recover damages for medical
expenses associated with pregnancy and childbirth. A controversy exists, however,
concerning whether parents may recover the ordinary expenses of child rearing. While some
states allow full recovery of these expenses, and other states allow recovery of the economic
expense offset by the emotional benefit of parenthood, the overwhelming majority, including
Washington, denies recovery of child-rearing expenses on the basis of public policy. By
comparing McKernan v. Aasheim, the Supreme Court of Washington decision denying child-
rearing damages for wrongful pregnancy, with other child-related torts in Washington, this
Comment exposes McKernan's erroneous and inconsistent application of tort principles and
demonstrates that strict application of tort principles mandates full recovery of child-rearing
expenses. Further, the state public policy relied on in McKernan cannot be maintained after
the passage of Initiative 120, which declared as Washington public policy that reproductive
rights are "fundamental." This Comment argues that child-rearing damages are necessary to
deter malpractice and fully compensate parents whose exercise of fundamental reproductive
rights has been substantially impaired by physician negligence.
Beginning in 1960, the availability of effective and convenient
contraceptive methods resulted in widespread changes in birth control.'
Access to reliable birth control has led to smaller families and longer
spacing between births, resulting in better health for infants, children,
and women and an improved social and economic role for women.2 The
U.S. Supreme Court supported access to birth control by invalidating, as
violative of fundamental privacy rights, statutes preventing the use and
distribution of contraceptives to married couples3 and unmarried
persons.4 So basic is the right to procreative autonomy and personal
1. See Center For Disease Control, Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999: Family Planning
(visited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4847al.htm>
[hereinafter Achievements] (noting that prior to introduction of birth control pills and intrauterine
devices, contraceptive methods most commonly used were condoms, contraceptive douches,
withdrawal, and rhythm method).
2. See id.
3. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
4. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (upholding fundamental privacy right of
unmarried persons to have access to contraceptives on equal protection grounds).
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privacy that the Court in Roe v. Wade5 held that women have the
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy prior to fetal viability.6
Through Initiative 1207 in 1991, Washington state voters proclaimed as
public policy that reproductive choice is a fundamental right
Today, nearly sixty-five percent of women of child-bearing age use
contraception to prevent pregnancy.' Although in the mid-i 960s the birth
control pill was the most popular method of contraception, the use of
surgical sterilization' ° has significantly increased over the last two
decades and is currently the most commonly used contraceptive method
in the United States. 2 High expectations for contraceptive efficacy,
safety, and convenience may have influenced couples to choose
permanent contraception through sterilization.' 3 Doctors advise patients
choosing sterilization that their decision to have no children in the future
must be firm: "You must be absolutely sure you will never change your
mind or regret your choice-no matter how your life changes."' 4
Unfortunately, expectations for contraceptive effectiveness and the
right to prevent pregnancy are sometimes thwarted by physician
negligence such as improperly performing tubal sterilizations and
vasectomies, ' giving incorrect medical advice, 6 and failing to replace
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. See id. at 163. Fetal viability may occur as early as the 24th week of pregnancy. See id. at 160.
7. See 1992 Wash. Laws 1 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.100 (1998)).
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See J.C. Abma et al., Fertility, Family Planning, and Women's Health: New Data From the
1995 National Survey of Family Growth (visited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
datawh/statab/pubd/23 19_41 .htm>.
10. Surgical sterilization includes vasectomy for men and tubal sterilization for women. A
vasectomy is considered permanent contraception. See Contraception Information Center, Journal of
the American Medical Association, All About Vasectomy (last modified June 1995)
<http:l/www.ama-assn.org/special/contra/support/ppfa/vasecto l.htm> [hereinafter Vasectomy].
Tubal sterilization is accomplished by closing off the fallopian tubes by various methods. See
Contraception Information Center, Journal of the American Medical Association, All About Tubal
Sterilization, (last modified July, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org/special/contra/support/ppfa/
tubal 1.htm> [hereinafter Tubal Sterilization].
11. See Achievements, supra note 1.
12. See Anjani Chandra, Surgical Sterilization in the United States: Prevalence and
Characteristics, 1965-95, Vital and Health Statistics, June 1998, at 2.
13. See id. (hypothesizing that introduction of birth control pill brought greater expectations for
method effectiveness, but health and safety concerns resulted in decreased reliance on pill).
14. Vasectomy, supra note 10; Tubal Sterilization, supra note 10.
15. See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294, 1296




intrauterine devices.' 7 In addition, physicians may fail to diagnose early
pregnancies" and inadequately perform abortions, 9  preventing
individuals from exercising their rights to terminate pregnancies before
fetal viability.
The increased expectation in the efficacy of contraception,2" coupled
with the belief that the constitutional right to procreative autonomy will
be protected,2' has increasingly led parents to seek legal compensation
when physician negligence has nullified their choice to prevent unwanted
pregnancy and childbirth.' Even though the majority of states recognize
a negligence cause of action for wrongful pregnancy, most jurisdictions
severely limit available damages by denying recovery of ordinary rearing
expenses for healthy children.2
This Comment argues that, because a right is only as valuable as the
remedy vindicating it, the Supreme Court of Washington should strictly
and consistently apply tort principles and allow child-rearing damages
for wrongful pregnancy. Part I summarizes U.S. constitutional and
Washington statutory bases of the right to choose to prevent pregnancies.
Part II explains the medical malpractice tort of wrongful pregnancy, tort-
recovery principles, and approaches to recovery for wrongful pregnancy.
Part III explores the application of tort principles to child-related tort
actions in Washington, including wrongful death, wrongful birth,
wrongful life, and wrongful adoption. Part III also examines McKernan
v. Aasheim,24 the Supreme Court of Washington's decision denying
16. See Bums v. Hanson, 734 A.2d 964,965 (Conn. 1999).
17. See Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743, 745 (N.C. 1986). An intrauterine device (IUD) is
a reversible contraceptive method in which a small device containing copper or a hormone is placed
in the uterus by a clinician. See Understanding IUDs, Contraception Information Center, Journal of
the American Medical Association (last modified Jan. 2000) <http://www.ama-
assn.org/special/contra/supportvppfaliudspb02.htm>. The negligence of other health care providers
sometimes results in wrongful pregnancy, such as a pharmacist's negligent dispensing of birth
control pills. See Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
18. See, e.g., M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851, 852 (Alaska 1998).
19. See Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301,302 (Va. 1986).
20. See, e.g., Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Wis. 1990) (stating patient believed
sterilization would be "permanent").
21. See McKeman v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,413, 687 P.2d 850, 851 (1984) (noting but not
addressing plaintiff's alleged infringement of constitutionally protected right).
22. Courts have accommodated changes in attitudes toward family planning by allowing lawsuits
against contraceptive services providers. See David J. Burke, Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy: Child
Rearing Damages Deserve FullJudicial Consideration, 8 Pace L. Rev. 313, 313 n.5 (1988).
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984).
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recovery of child-rearing damages for wrongful pregnancy. Part IV
argues that McKernan fails to uphold the traditional tort principles of
compensation and deterrence and that the decision rests on baseless fears
and outdated public policy. Finally, Part V argues that full recovery of
child-rearing expenses is necessary to vindicate the constitutionally and
statutorily protected fundamental right to prevent pregnancy.
I. THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE NOT TO PROCREATE IS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
A. The U.S. Constitution Protects the Right to Privacy Including the
Right To Choose Not To Procreate
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed "no doubt" as to the
correctness of judicial decisions extending the constitutionally protected
right to privacy to personal choices concerning contraception. 5 The right
to choose not to have a child is at the "very heart" of a group of
constitutionally protected choices, including decisions relating to
marriage, family relationships, child rearing, and education.26 The choice
whether to bear or beget a child is central to these Fourteenth
Amendment privacy rights27 because it concerns the "most intimate and
personal" choice a person may make in his or her lifetime. For
example, in Carey v. Population Services International,29 the Court held
that government restrictions that impede access to contraceptives
unacceptably impair the right to privacy3" because such access is
''essential to the exercise" of constitutionally protected reproductive
rights.3' Further, the Court has held that the right of privacy is broad
enough to include a woman's decision whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy.32
25. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (citing Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
26. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
27. See id.
28. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
29. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
30. See id. at 685.
31. Id. at 688-89.




When evaluating cases involving reproductive rights, courts must rely
on legal standards and not moral arguments. In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,33 the Court acknowledged the differing moral opinions
concerning the "meaning of procreation" and "human responsibility and
respect for it."'34 One viewpoint is based on such "reverence for the
wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed ... no
matter how difficult it will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-
being."'35 The other view is that the "inability to provide for the nurture
and care of the infant is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the
parent."'36 The Court has recognized that these moral dilemmas underlie
both contraceptive and abortion decisions. 7 In the landmark case of Roe
v. Wade,38 the Court acknowledged that religion, life and family values,
and moral standards are likely to influence one's thinking, but concluded
that courts must decide reproductive issues based on legal standards "free
of emotion and of predilection." '39
B. Washington State Public Policy Protects the Right to Choose Birth
Control
In 1991, Washington state voters passed Initiative 120 declaring as the
state's public policy concerning birth control and abortion that "every
individual possesses a fundamental right of privacy with respect to
personal reproductive decisions."'4 The impetus for the initiative was
concern that the U.S. Supreme Court would overrule Roe v. Wade.4
Although seen as an abortion-rights initiative,42 the law also declared that
"[e]very individual has the fundamental right to choose or refuse birth
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. Id. at 852-53.
35. Id. at 853.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 852-53.
38. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
39. Id. at 116.
40. 1992 Wash. Laws 1 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.100 (1998)).
41. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Editorial, Initiative 120: Should Abortion Laws Be Reversed? Yes,
Seattle Times, Oct. 13, 1991, at A17 (noting initiative safeguards reproductive privacy regardless of
U.S. Supreme Court reversal or restriction of abortion rights).




control. 43 Washington law also prevents state discrimination against the
exercise of these rights in the "regulation or provision of benefits,
facilities, services, or information."' For example, because Washington
provides state-funded prenatal and maternity care, it must also fund
abortion services for qualified women.45 The public policy of
Washington state is that the right to choose whether or not to have a child
is a fundamental right.
II. THE TORT OF WRONGFUL PREGNANCY: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES, PARAMETERS, AND THEORIES OF
RECOVERY
Wrongful pregnancy is a type of medical malpractice claim based on
provider negligence. If a plaintiff successfully proves a negligence claim,
tort-recovery principles normally hold the tortfeasor responsible for all
harm caused by the conduct. The potential recovery may be reduced by
any incidental benefit to the same interest harmed as a result of the
conduct, by the plaintiffs failure to avoid additional harm, or both.
Jurisdictions, however, vary in their application of these tort-recovery
principles to wrongful pregnancy and thereby affect the ability of parents
to recover child-rearing damages.
A. The Negligence Tort of Wrongful Pregnancy
The medical malpractice tort of wrongful pregnancy is distinct from
other causes of action involving the birth of a child. Despite some
confusion in applying labels to such actions, a consensus in terminology
has developed.46 Wrongful birth can be brought by parents and refers to
an action based on a health-care provider's alleged breach of duty to the
parents to disclose information or perform medical procedures with due
care and the breach is a proximate cause of the birth of a defective
child.4 7 Wrongful life is a cause of action brought on a child's behalf to
recover damages for having been born with defects due to the act or
43. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.100(1) (1998).
44. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.100(4) (1998).
45. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.100(4); Washington Secretary of State, Voters Pamphlet 14-15
(Ist ed. 1991).





omission of the health-care provider." Wrongful pregnancy refers to an
action brought by parents of a healthy child whose birth is allegedly
caused by a breach of duty owed to the parents, such as a negligently
performed sterilization.49
Wrongful pregnancy, like other medical malpractice torts," requires
proving the negligence elements: duty, breach, proximate cause, and
damage or injury. For a successful claim, wrongful pregnancy plaintiffs
must establish the defendant had a duty to meet the standard of care52 and
show the defendant breached this duty. 3 A plaintiff must also prove that
the defendant's alleged failure to meet the standard of care was the
proximate cause of the harm allegedly suffered. 4 Because medical facts
regarding sterilization procedures are normally outside the experience of
lay persons, 5 proving the standard of care and causation usually requires
expert testimony. 6 Finally, plaintiffs must prove they were in fact
harmed57 and suffered damages 8 assessable with reasonable certainty.59
Due in part to the requirement of expert testimony, the costs of
bringing a medical malpractice action can be substantial. One expert
48. See Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tenn. 1987).
49. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 467, 656 P.2d 483, 488 (1983).
Wrongful pregnancy claims include wrongful conception claims, where the negligence is causally
connected to failing to prevent conception resulting in pregnancy, and further encompasses failing to
diagnose a pregnancy or negligently performing an abortion. See Mark Strasser, Misconceptions and
Wrongful Births: A Call For a Principled Jurisprudence, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 161, 162-63 (1999).
Therefore, this Comment will use the term "wrongful pregnancy" to refer to both wrongful
pregnancy and wrongful conception causes of action.
50. See Girdley, 825 S.W.2d at 296.
51. See Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 468, 656 P.2d at 489.
52. A health-care provider meets the standard of care by demonstrating reasonable prudence and
the degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other members of the medical profession in the
state. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.040 (1998).
53. See Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 467, 656 P.2d at 489.
54. See id. at 467-68, 656 P.2d at 489. Mere failure to prevent an unwanted pregnancy does not
automatically indicate causation. See Johnston v. Elkins, 736 P.2d 935, 939 (Kan. 1987).
55. See Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 251, 391 P.2d 201,204 (1964).
56. See Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc, 99 Wash. 2d 438, 449, 663 P.2d 113, 118-19
(1983).
57. See McKeman v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,419, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (1984).
58. Damages are separated into "general damages," which cannot be exactly quantified in
monetary terms such as mental or physical pain and suffering, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment
and "special damages," which are quantifiable economic losses such as medical and hospital
expenses and lost wages. See 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 41 (1988).
59. See McKernan, 102 Wash. 2d at 419 n.2, 687 P.2d at 855 n.2.
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estimates these costs to reach approximately $20,000 for a wrongful
pregnancy case and up to $100,000 for a more complex medical
malpractice action.6" Plaintiffs' attorneys are reluctant to represent clients
in medical malpractice cases where there has not been a significant
permanent injury or where there is no potential recovery of long-term
special damages. 6' Therefore, few plaintiffs have brought wrongful
pregnancy cases in Washington since the decision in McKernan v.
Aasheim62 denying child-rearing damages.63
B. Tort-Recovery Principles
If a plaintiff proves the necessary elements of a negligence claim,
courts award damages for two purposes: (1) to provide an incentive to
prevent future harm,' and (2) to make the victim as whole as possible
through monetary compensation. To accomplish these ends a tortfeasor
normally is held liable for all the harm proximately caused.66
A victim's potential total recovery is subject to reduction. Section 920
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recommends that triers of fact
consider whether the injured plaintiff has benefited as a result of the
tortious conduct when assessing total damages.67 When applying this
rule, courts must offset damages to a plaintiffs particular interest by the
amount that same interest has been benefited by the defendant's tortious
conduct.68 The Restatement specifically opposes using a dissimilar
interest as an offset. For example, when suing for the wrongful death of
his wife, a husband's claim for loss of consortium is not offset because
he no longer has to contribute to her financial support.69 Courts will deny
60. Telephone Interview with Mark A. Johnson, Chairman, Professional Negligence Section,
Washington State Trial Lawyers Ass'n (Feb. 20, 2000).
61. See id.
62. 102 Wash. 2d 411,687 P.2d 850 (1984); see also infra Part III.D.
63. See Telephone Interview with Mark A. Johnson, supra note 59.
64. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 4, at 25 (5th ed. 1984).
65. Aker Verdal A/S v. Neil F. Lampson, Inc., 65 Wash. App. 177, 183, 828 P.2d 610, 613
(1992).
66. See Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 234, 588 P.2d 1308,
1312 (1978).
67. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 (1979).
68. Cf Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 cmts. a, b.
69. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 cmts. a, b ("Damages resulting from an invasion of




liability unless the net result establishes that a plaintiff has suffered
damage that can be assessed with reasonable certainty. 0
In addition to potentially decreasing a plaintiffs recovery based on
section 920, courts also consider adjusting a plaintiff's recovery based on
the avoidable-consequences doctrine. This doctrine requires an injured
party to use reasonable effort to avoid further harm after the tort has been
committed.7' However, a reasonable person threatened with future harm
may refuse mitigation that would subject him or her to a different kind of
pain.72 Courts are split over whether the avoidable-consequences doctrine
requires wrongful pregnancy plaintiffs to utilize abortion or adoption to
mitigate their damages.73
Courts have either refused to apply these tort principles strictly or
have modified them in the wrongful pregnancy child-rearing damages
context. The result is a sharp discrepancy in wrongful pregnancy
recovery from state to state.
C. Jurisdictional Approaches to Wrongful Pregnancy Recovery
Historically, courts denied any recovery for wrongful pregnancy based
on the blessings doctrine.74 This doctrine, traced to Christensen v.
Thornby," holds that the birth of a human being is not a harm, but rather
a blessing that precludes any damages award.76 Courts followed the
blessings doctrine until Custodio v. Bauer7" rejected the policy arguments
70. See, e.g., McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 419 n.2, 687 P.2d 850, 855 n.2 (1984)
(requiring reasonable basis, not mathematical precision, for estimating plaintiff's loss).
71. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 (1979).
72. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 cmt. d. For example, a patient whose broken leg was
improperly set can recover for such pain without being required to go through the pain of re-
breaking the leg to reset the bone. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 cmt. d.
73. Compare Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C. 1984) (noting
avoidance of consequences of negligent sterilization "obviously" accomplished by abortion or
adoption), with Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Wis. 1990) (holding it is not
reasonable to require abortion or adoption to mitigate child-rearing damages).
74. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Minn. 1977); see also Ball v. Mudge,
64 Wash. 2d 247, 249-50, 391 P.2d 201, 203-04 (1964) (upholding jury's finding of no proximate
cause but adding in dicta that reasonablejury could find plaintiffs not damaged where "blessing of a
cherished child" far outweighed child-rearing costs).
75. 255 N.W. 620, 621 (Minn. 1934) (finding no liability, but opining that "[i]nstead of losing his
wife, the plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of another child").
76. Christopher D. Jerram, Note, Child Rearing Expenses as a Compensable Damage in a
Wrongful Conception Case: Burke v. Rivo, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 1643, 1649 (1991).
77. 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
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asserted by earlier courts"8 and concluded "that the birth of a child may
be something less than [a] 'blessed event.' ' 79 The Custodios brought suit
after Mrs. Custodio, despite having undergone a tubal ligation after
giving birth to their ninth child,80 gave birth to their tenth child.8 ' The
court determined that the expense of the operation was recoverable
together with damages for physical complications and, if proven, mental
and physical pain and suffering. 2 The court also allowed damages for the
necessity of the mother to care for, protect, and support a larger family.8
Most importantly, the court allowed full child-rearing damages,
reasoning that the compensation was not for the "so-called unwanted
child.., but to replenish the family exchequer.. ." so that the new baby
would not deprive other family members of what would have been their
share of the family income. 4
Since Custodio, courts have generally agreed that wrongful pregnancy
is actionable85 but have disagreed over recoverable damages. Forty-three
jurisdictions have found a valid tort cause of action for damages resulting
from the birth of an unwanted child. 6 In virtually every such jurisdiction,
courts award damages for lost wages, loss of consortium, and medical
expenses and pain and suffering associated with the failed procedure,
pregnancy, and childbirth. 7 Some courts allow damages for emotional
distress, 8 while others expressly deny recovery for emotional pain and
78. See id. at 473-74.
79. Id. at 475.
80. See id. at 466.
81. See id. at 476.
82. See id. at 475-77.
83. See id. at 476.
84. Id. at 477.
85. See Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 411 (R.I. 1997) (noting that only one court of last
resort failed to recognize tort cause of action for negligently performed sterilizations). The Supreme
Court of Nevada denied a wrongful pregnancy negligence claim. See Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d
1076, 1078 (Nev. 1986). However, recovery of the costs of medical, surgical, and hospital care
associated with the failed surgery could be awarded where the physician contracted, but failed, to
prevent pregnancy. See id. at 1079.
86. See infra notes 91, 104-05 accompanying text. Two jurisdictions have allowed wrongful
pregnancy actions, but did not address the issue of child-rearing damages. See Carr v. Strode, 904
P.2d 489, 504 (Haw. 1995); Begin v. Richmond, 555 A.2d 363, 368 (Vt. 1988).
87. See, e.g., Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984). Only one
court has explicitly recognized damages for the mother's lost earning capacity. See Burke v. Rivo,
551 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Mass. 1990).




suffering. 9 Jurisdictions, however, sharply divide over whether parents
can recover the ordinary child-rearing expenses incurred as a result of the
birth of the initially unwanted child.9"
This disagreement stems from varying applications of tort-recovery
principles and results in three approaches to wrongful pregnancy child-
rearing damages recovery. Most jurisdictions refuse to award the costs of
rearing an unplanned child and thereby make an exception to the
principle holding the tortfeasor fully responsible for harms caused. Other
courts allow child-rearing damages but divide further into two classes:
those that apply the benefits rule-requiring the financial interest harmed
to be offset by a dissimilar interest, the emotional benefits of
parenthood-and those that allow full recovery of child-rearing damages.
1. Limited-Damages Rule: Only Pregnancy and Childbirth Costs
Recoverable
The vast majority of jurisdictions adheres to the "limited damages
rule" for wrongful pregnancy damages, permitting recovery for the costs
of the failed procedure, pregnancy, and childbirth-related damages.9'
These courts articulate one or more of a variety of public-policy reasons
for denying child-rearing damages. Some courts implicitly apply the
blessings doctrine, holding that "in a proper hierarchy of values"92 the
89. See, e.g., Emerson, 689 A.2d at 414.
90. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 387 (ll. 1983).
91. In all, 32 jurisdictions limit recovery to pregnancy and child-bearing expenses. See generally
Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); M.A. v. United States, 961 P.2d 861 (Alaska
1998); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975);
Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822
(Fla. 1984); Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653; Cockrum, 447 N.E.2d 385; Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984); Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d
459 (Kan. 1985); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530
So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Rouse v. Wesley, 494
N.W.2d 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1992); Hitzemann v.
Adams, 518 N.W.2d 102 (Neb. 1994); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); P. v.
Portadin, 432 A.2d 556 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1981); O'Toole v. Greenberg, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143
(N.Y. 1985); Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986); Johnson v. University Hosps. of
Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1989); Morris v. Sanchez. 746 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1987); Mason v.
Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982); Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409 (RI. 1997);
Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738; Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); C.S. v. Nielson, 767
P.2d 504 (Utah 1988); Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301 (Va. 1986); McKeman v. Aasheim, 102
Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Beardsley
v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
92. Cockrum, 447 N.E.2d at 389.
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benefits-such as joy, companionship, and affection-of raising a
healthy child far outweigh the costs.93 These courts reason that
considering a child an "injury offends fundamental concepts attached to
human life,"94 which is "presumptively valuable."95 Other courts fear for
the mental and emotional health of the children who will one day learn
not only that they were unwanted by their parents but also that another
person paid their rearing expenses.96
Courts adhering to the limited-damages rule reject strict application of
tort principles, which normally hold the tortfeasor responsible for all
harm caused, to wrongful pregnancy because the application of strict tort
principles would also require application of section 9209" and the
avoidable-consequences doctrine.98 These courts offset child-rearing
costs, an economic interest, with the non-economic benefits of the child's
companionship, comfort, and aid to the parent.99 By comparing these
dissimilar interests, limited-damages courts determine that assessing non-
economic benefits and deducting them from the economic expense of
child rearing renders the damages "incalculable"'' 0  and too
speculative.' 0 ' These courts also reject applying section 920 because of
the belief that requiring consideration of any emotional benefit might
lead to parents disparaging their child's worth in order to minimize the
offset and maximize their recovery.'0 2 Finally, these courts fear that strict
application of the avoidable-consequences doctrine might require parents
to abort or give their child up for adoption in order to mitigate
damages."0 3
93. See, e.g., Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 293. Some courts so hold as a matter of law. See, e.g., Nanke,
346 N.W.2d at 522-23.
94. Schork, 648 S.W.2d at 862.
95. Rouse, 494 N.W.2d at 10.
96. See Boone, 416 So. 2d at 722.
97. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1076 (D.C. 1984) (objecting to
applying section 920 and avoidable consequences doctrine to wrongful pregnancy); see also supra
notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Johnson v. University Hosps. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1373 (Ohio 1989)
(citing Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984)).
100. Beardsley v. Weirdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 293 (Wyo. 1982).
101. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 12 (Del. 1975).
102. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982).




2. Child-Rearing Costs Recoverable
A minority of jurisdictions concludes there should be recovery for at
least some child-rearing expenses. These courts refuse to make
exceptions to the standard application of tort principles, rejecting the
emotional premises and public-policy arguments of the limited-damages
rule in favor of upholding plaintiffs' constitutional rights not to
procreate. Jurisdictions allowing recovery are, however, further divided
whether to permit full recovery of child-rearing costs'04 or to require an
offset for the emotional benefits of parenthood.0 5
a. Rejection ofLimited-Damages Rule
Courts allowing recovery of child-rearing costs strictly adhere to the
tort principle requiring a tortfeasor to assume liability for all the damages
proximately caused, refusing to make exceptions based on public
policy.0 6 These courts hold physicians legally responsible for the
consequences they caused.'0 7 Courts considering whether the strict
application of tort principles to child-rearing damages would require
avoidance of consequences by aborting or putting the child up for
adoption have held, as a matter of law, that neither course of action
would be reasonable and thus failure to so act is not a barrier to
recovery.108
Courts refusing to adhere to the limited-damages rule reject the fear
that a child will suffer significant emotional harm from discovering his
or her parents sued to recover child-rearing costs. Instead, these courts
accept the proposition that parents, not courts, are better suited to decide
what is best for the child.0 9 The courts assume that in the future the child
will be able to distinguish the emotional support the parents are willing
104. See generally Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Lovelace Med. Ctr.
v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991); Zehr v. Haugen, 871 P.2d 1006 (Or. 1994); Marciniak v.
Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
105. See generally University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294
(Ariz. 1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md.
1984); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. 1977).
106. See Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885.
107. See Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d at 248.
108. See id. at 247.
109. See University ofAriz., 667 P.2d at 1300.
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and able to give from the economic means of support they sought in
court." ' The courts speculate that knowing his or her parents had
financial assistance with child-rearing costs might alleviate the distress
of discovering that he or she was initially unwanted."' One court
allowing child-rearing costs noted with irony that limited-damages courts
express concern of potential emotional harm to the child if his or her
parents recover child-rearing costs but nonetheless allow recovery of
pregnancy and childbirth expenses, where an equal potential for
emotional harm exists."
2
Jurisdictions allowing at least some recovery of child-rearing expenses
imply that the right to recover is related to the parents' constitutional
right to choose not to procreate."3 The recognition of child-rearing costs
as a compensable element of damages in wrongful pregnancy cases
protects this right." 4 Courts reject the emotional and sentimental
justifications for the limited-damages rule-that child-rearing damages
disparage the value of human life or the societal need for harmonious
family units' -in favor of applying "logical considerations"'' 6 and
standard tort principles. These courts explicitly reject the proposition that
the benefits of child rearing outweigh the economic burden of rearing a
child for all parents, noting the widespread exercise of the constitutional
right to contraception, sterilization, and abortion." 1
7
b. Child-Rearing Costs Reduced by the "Benefits " Rule
Courts requiring an offset for emotional benefits of parenting against
child-rearing damages do so based on section 920'.. and are referred to as
110. See Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d at 246.
111. See Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Mass. 1990); see also Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
112. See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 4.
113. See, e.g., Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (Conn. 1982) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965)).
114. See id.
115. See Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (Md. 1984).
116. University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294, 1298-99 (Ariz.
1983); see also supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 4.
118. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977); see also supra




adhering to the "benefits" rule." 9 Benefits-rule jurisdictions reject the
view of the limited-damages courts because calculating child-rearing
costs is routine 2° and assessing the offset for the benefit is just the
opposite of assessing damages in the wrongful death of a child.'
Benefits-rule jurisdictions, however, also reject full recovery of child-
rearing damages because allowing full recovery "prevents the trier of fact
from considering the basic values inherent in the relationship and the
dignity and sanctity of human life."'" These courts reason, for example,
that applying the benefits rule recognizes that "parental pleasure
softens.., economic reality"'" and thereby prevents unjust
enrichment. 24 Some benefits-rule courts direct juries to consider the
reason the parents sought sterilization."2 If the reason parents sought
sterilization was not economically based, but rather to prevent harm to
the mother or the birth of a defective child, the parents are deemed to
have suffered no financial injury from the birth of a healthy child with no
adverse health effects to the mother.'26
c. Full Recovery of Child-Rearing Costs Allowed
Courts allowing full recovery of child-rearing costs reject applying the
benefits rule as violative of the section 920 "same interest"
requirement. 27 Full-recovery courts emphasize that wrongful pregnancy
damages compensate for the financial expense incident to raising the
child and not for the child's birth as the "harm."' Further, these courts
119. See, e.g., McKeman v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 416-17, 687 P.2d 850, 853 (1984).
120. See Jones, 473 A.2d at 436.
121. See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 6 n.6.
122. University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Ariz.
1983).
123. Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 885-86 (Conn. 1985).
124. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
125. See, e.g., University ofAriz., 667 P.2d at 1300.
126. See Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429,436 (Md. 1984).
127. See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 249 (Wis. 1990). In recognition of this
principle, one court allowing full recovery of child-rearing costs denied recovery for emotional
distress because it would properly be offset by any emotional benefit and it feared this could lead to
the "unseemly spectacle" of disparaging the child in order to minimize the offset. Lovelace Med.
Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 613 (N.M. 1991). But see Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d at 249 (reasoning it
was inequitable to apply section 920 to either economic or emotional interest because it was
precisely this benefit parents sought to avoid through sterilization).
128. See, e.g., Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 609 ('[l]t is not the birth of the child that is the harm; it
is... the invasion of the parents' interest in the financial security of their family .... "); Marciniak,
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reject the need to consider the parents' reasons for seeking sterilization
because the initial reasons do not conclusively determine whether the
parents' economic interest has been injured. 9
III. RECOGNIZED CAUSES OF ACTION CONCERNING
CHILDREN IN WASHINGTON
Washington strictly applies traditional tort principles-holding
tortfeasors responsible for all harm caused and offsetting harms by any
benefit to the same interest-in several causes of action concerning
children. The same-interest rule is followed in wrongful death and
wrongful birth. Whether the child will suffer emotional harm from the
ensuing litigation is generally not a concern in wrongful birth, wrongful
life, or wrongful adoption causes of action. When considering wrongful
pregnancy damages, however, Washington courts make an exception to
these principles based on public policy.
A. Wrongful Death of a Child
Washington has recognized a statutory action for the wrongful death
of a child for more than 130 years.' The statute left damages wholly to
the courts, which for seventy-five years were measured as the value to
parents of the child's services until majority, less the cost of support and
maintenance during that interval. 3 ' Because a child's services were
worth little in a modem economy, this measure seldom resulted in more
than nominal recovery; therefore, in 1967 the Supreme Court of
Washington extended the measure of damages definition to include an
emotional-harm component.' Six days later a legislative amendment
went into effect prescribing damages for loss of love and companionship
450 N.W.2d at 246 ("The suit is for the costs of raising the child, not to rid themselves of an
unwanted child.").
129. See Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 612 (giving example of professional woman who sought
sterilization for non-economic reasons but finds her financial situation and long-term prospects
abruptly changed as result of unexpected birth).
130. See Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash. 2d 91, 102-04, 491 P.2d 1287, 1293-94 (1971) (Wright, J.,
concurring).
131. See Skeels v. Davidson, 18 Wash. 2d 358, 368-69, 139 P.2d 301, 305-06 (1943).





and destruction of the parent-child relationship.' 3 In spite of the addition
of emotional damages, the court continued to require offset of only the
harmed pecuniary interest (loss of child's services), and not the
emotional interest, by the benefit of the foregone child-rearing expenses
due to the death of the child.
34
B. Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Washington faced the issue whether to
allow a causes of action for wrongful birth, wrongful life, or both in
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.'13 Finding the tort of wrongful birth
actionable, the court concluded that parents have a constitutional
reproductive right to prevent the birth of a defective child, that health-
care providers have a correlative duty to honor that right, 36 and that
recognition of that right will deter medical malpractice.'37 To determine
the damages available to parents in a wrongful birth action, the court
analogized to the damages available for the wrongful death of a child.
1 38
The court noted that the wrongful death statute allows for recovery of
both pecuniary loss and emotional injury, and saw no reason why this
policy should not also apply in the case of wrongful birth. 39 Recoverable
pecuniary damages included the expense of the child's birth and the
medical, hospital, and medication expenses attributable to the child's
defective condition.14 In addition, parents could recover for their
emotional injuries caused by the birth of the child, offset by the
"countervailing" emotional benefits from the birth of the child. 4 ' The
court was not concerned with potential emotional harm to the defective
child from the parent's lawsuit.
133. See 1967 Wash. Laws 1734 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.010 (1998)).
134. See Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash. 2d 201, 210, 432 P.2d 541, 547 (1967)
(reducing $33,025 judgment by $15,000 (portion attributable to loss of services) because no attempt
was made to show that value of such services exceeded cost to parents of child's support and
maintenance). The court seemed unconcerned about whether the emotional damages exceeded child-
rearing costs. See id.
135. 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
136. See idt at 472, 656 P.2d at 491 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
137. See id. at 473, 656 P.2d at 491.
138. See id. at 474-75, 656 P.2d at 492-93 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.010 (1994)).





To provide a "comprehensive and consistent deterrent to malpractice,"
the Harbeson court extended the policies associated with a parent's claim
for wrongful birth to a child's claim for wrongful life.'4 2 The court
limited damages to the calculable extraordinary expense for medical care
and special training.'43 The court denied general damages," which
required measuring the value of an impaired existence as compared to
nonexistence (a task "beyond mortals"), because such damages could not
be established with reasonable certainty. 45
C. Wrongful Adoption
Washington recently recognized a cause of action for wrongful
adoption in McKinney v. State. 46 The action arose when an adoption-
placement agency negligently failed to disclose information about an
impaired child's medical, psychological, and familial background. 47 The
parents claimed that had the agency disclosed the information they would
not have adopted the child. 48 The court determined that adoption
agencies have a duty to provide an adoptive child's medical and social
information in a timely manner based both on statute 149 and the unique
relationship between an adoption agency and prospective parents) 5°
Damages were not at issue because the court upheld the jury's finding
that the agency's negligence did not impact the McKinney's decision to
adopt the impaired child and therefore did not proximately cause them
any harm.'' Potential relief includes damage awards and revocation of
adoptions where there was a failure to disclose the health information on
142. Id. at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
143. See id. at 482, 656 P.2d at 496-97. The child's recovery is limited to damages from majority
and beyond if the parents recovered expenses up to majority in a wrongfil birth action. See id. at
480, 656 P.2d at 495.
144. See supra note 58.
145. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 482, 656 P.2d at 496.
146. 134 Wash. 2d 388, 950 P.2d 461 (1998).
147. See id. at 394, 950 P.2d at 464.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 396, 950 P.2d at 465 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.350 (1994) and Wash. Rev.
Code § 26.33.380 (1994)).
150. See id. at 397, 950 P.2d at 466.




adoptive children.' Before the McKinney decision, commentators had
raised concerns regarding the potential adverse psychological effect on
children of the requirement that the parents prove they would not have
adopted the child if fully informed.' The court, however, was silent on
the issue.
D. Wrongful Pregnancy
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Washington faced the issue of whether
child-rearing damages were available in a wrongful pregnancy action in
McKernan v. Aasheim. s4 Notwithstanding a tubal ligation, Mrs.
McKeman became pregnant and gave birth to a healthy child.155 The
McKernans filed suit against Dr. Aasheim alleging negligence, lack of
informed consent, breach of warranty, and violation of their
constitutional right to prevent future pregnancies.'56 In addition to
damages related directly to the procedure, pregnancy, and childbirth, the
McKernans alleged damages for the costs associated with rearing the
child, a college education, and emotional burdens.5 7 The trial court
granted Dr. Aasheim's motion for partial summary judgment and
dismissed the portion of the complaint that sought damages for the costs
of rearing and educating the child.' The supreme court accepted direct
review. 15
9
The court acknowledged that the majority of jurisdictions considering
the issue had refused to award child-rearing costs but dismissed, as
unpersuasive, many of the reasons cited by those courts. t6 For example,
the court reasoned that the benefits of parenthood could not always
outweigh the costs of rearing a child, or people would not choose to be
152. See D. Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: The
Limits ofLiabilityfor WrongflIAdoption, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 851, 854 n.6 (1992).
153. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 152, at 900 (citing John R. Maley, Note, Wrongful Adoption:
Monetary Damages As a Superior Remedy to Annulment ofAdoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption
Fraud, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 709, 730 (1987)).
154. 102 Wash. 2d 411,687 P.2d 850 (1984).
155. See id. at 412, 687 P.2d at 851.




160. See id. at 414-18, 687 P.2d at 852-54.
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sterilized.' 6' Further, allowing child-rearing damages would not place an
unreasonable burden on health-care providers. 62 In any case, the court
determined that it is not the judiciary's responsibility to deny child-
rearing damages in order to protect health-care providers from large tort
awards. 163 The court trusted that juries could distinguish legitimate from
fraudulent claims."6 The court noted-but did not address-the question
of whether strict application of tort principles would require application
of the avoidable-consequences doctrine.'65 The court did acknowledge,
however, that jurisdictions allowing some recovery of child-rearing
expenses have held that both abortion and adoption were unreasonable
means of mitigation.166
The McKernan court nonetheless denied recovery of child-rearing
costs. 67 The court reasoned that full recovery of child-rearing costs went
"too far" because a child is more than an "economic liability" and may
provide his or her parents with "love, companionship, a sense of
achievement, and a limited form of immortality."'' 68 While recognizing
that the benefits rule would weigh the benefits of parenthood against the
child-rearing costs, the court concluded that it could not be applied in
Washington for two reasons. 69 First, the court reasoned that the damages
assessed under the benefits rule are too speculative because whether
child-rearing costs outweigh the emotional benefits of parenthood is not
calculable with reasonable certainty. 7 ° Emotional benefits would vary
depending on whether the child "turn[s] out to be loving, obedient and
attentive, or hostile, unruly or callous" or "grow[s] up to be President of
the United States, or to be an infamous criminal."'' Second, the court
warned that the benefits rule might compel parents to prove the child




165. See id. at 417, 687 P.2d at 854; see also infra note 196 and accompanying text.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 419, 687 P.2d at 854.
168. Id.






"was more trouble than it was worth" by disparaging their child's value
to them in order to maximize their recovery of child-rearing expenses.'72
The court was also unwilling to allow full recovery of child-rearing
expenses because of fear of emotionally harming the child. The court
was convinced that a potential for significant harm to the child existed
from "being an unwanted or 'emotional bastard,' who will some day
learn that its parents did not want it and, in fact, went to court to force
someone else to pay for its raising.... ." ' The court refused to leave the
decision to the parents about whether to risk the emotional psyche of
their unplanned child.'75 Determining that permitting recovery of child-
rearing expenses violated the public policy of the state, the court adopted
the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which stated that "'[i]t
is a question which meddles with the concept of life and the stability of
the family unit... [and] will undermine society's need for a strong and
healthy family relationship."'176
Finally, the court concluded that the denial of child-rearing damages
would not immunize negligent physicians from all liability resulting
from unsuccessful sterilizations because some damages could be
established with reasonable certainty.' Specifically, plaintiffs could
recover for the expense, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium
associated with the failed sterilization, pregnancy, and child birth.'78
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON ERRED IN
DENYING CHILD-REARING DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL
PREGNANCY
The McKernan court's reasoning that child-rearing damages are too
speculative is based on the court's belief that the economic harm of child
rearing must be offset by the emotional benefits of parenthood, a
misapplication of section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In no
other child-related tort do Washington courts offset the harm by a benefit
to a dissimilar interest. Nor do Washington courts consider the potential
172. Id. at 420, 687 P.2d at 855.
173. See id. at 421, 687 P.2d at 855.
174. Id. at 421, 687 P.2d at 856 (quoting Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982)).
175. See id. at 421, 687 P.2d at 855.
176. Id. at 421, 687 P.2d at 856 (quoting Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982)).
177. See id. at 421-22, 687 P.2d at 856.
178. See id. at 421, 687 P.2d at 855.
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emotional harm to the subject child in other child-related torts. The
current denial of child-rearing damages is based, not on legal standards,
but on emotional considerations that no longer reflect the public policy
of Washington. The failure of Washington courts to allow child-rearing
costs, the largest element of damages, renders the pursuit of wrongful
pregnancy claims cost inefficient, leaving victims with little or no
remedy and providing diminished incentive for physicians to use due
care.
A. The McKeman Court Erroneously and Inconsistently Applied Tort
Principles When Denying Recovery for Child-Rearing Damages
The Supreme Court of Washington misconceived section 920 by
requiring that the harm of economic expense be offset by emotional
benefits. Among torts involving children, this erroneous application of
section 920 occurs only in the wrongful pregnancy context. Once section
920 is applied properly, McKernan's argument about speculative
damages is irrelevant because child-rearing damages are routinely
calculated. Further, the avoidable-consequences doctrine does not require
that wrongful pregnancy plaintiffs mitigate through abortion or adoption,
as it would be unreasonable to force those choices onto parents.
1. Tort Principles Oppose Using a Dissimilar Interest as an Offset
No basis exists for requiring the economic injury suffered by parents
raising an unexpected child to be offset by the emotional benefit they
sought to avoid, but may now enjoy. Section 920, from which the
benefits rule is derived,'79 contemplates that harm and the offsetting
benefit will be the same type of interest.' Therefore section 920 does
not intend that a financial harm, such as child-rearing costs, must or
should be offset by an emotional benefit, such as the joys of parenthood,
as this offset compares "apples to oranges."''
179. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
180. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 cmt. a (1979).




2. The Supreme Court of Washington Does Not Require Consideration
of Dissimilar Interests for Purposes of Offset in Other Child-
Related Torts
The Supreme Court of Washington has validated the same-interest
requirement of section 920 in other tort cases involving children.' In
actions for the wrongful death of a child, the court requires the economic
"loss of service" component to be offset by the benefit of not having to
pay the financial cost of support and maintenance of the deceased
child.' The damages for loss of services are usually nominal under
modem economic circumstances"s4 while the economic benefit of not
having to pay child-rearing expenses is substantial.'85 Unlike wrongful
pregnancy actions, the court does not require that the resulting net-
economic benefit carry over as an offset to the emotional harm of losing
the child.
8 6
In wrongful birth actions, for example, the court correctly applies the
same-interest policy by requiring the countervailing emotional benefit of
raising the defective child to be considered when assessing damages for
emotional-distress injuries.'8 7 It is possible the emotional benefit of
raising a child with a defect, who may spend more time with the parents,
could equal or exceed that of raising a healthy child. The court, however,
does not compel juries to offset the economic interest of extraordinary
medical care and educational expenses with the emotional benefit of
rearing a child,88 although such emotional benefits could eclipse
ordinary child-rearing costs. 9
182. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 482, 656 P.2d 483, 496-97
(1983); Clark v. Icicle Irrigation Dist., 72 Wash. 2d 201, 209-10, 432 P.2d 541, 546-47 (1967); see
also supra notes 134, 141 and accompanying text.
183. See Clark, 72 Wash.2d at 210,432 P.2d at 547.
184. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
185. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates the cost of rearing a child in the United States
to be between $177,250 and $350,2 10. See Mark Lino, Expenditures on Children by Families, 1998
Annual Report, U.S. Dep't. of Agric., Miscellaneous Publication No. 1528-1998 at I I tbl.12 (1999).
186. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
187. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 475, 656 P.2d 483,493 (1983).
188. See id.
189. See McKeman v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,419-20, 687 P.2d 850, 854-55 (1984).
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3. Child-Rearing Damages Are Not Too Speculative To Permit
Recovery
The court's concern is misplaced because child-rearing damages are
not too speculative to permit recovery in wrongful pregnancy cases if
offset of harm by a dissimilar interest is not required. In Washington, tort
damages must be established with reasonable certainty.' Courts can
utilize economic demographers, actuarial and insurance-company
statistics,"' and population studies"' to assess child-rearing costs. The
U.S. Department of Agriculture annually estimates child-rearing costs
and is able discreetly to categorize those costs by specific expenditure
and vary the estimate by income level and geographic region.1 3 The
financial interest of the parents has, in fact, been calculably injured by
the cost to raise a child they had not planned and sought permanently to
prevent.' Only the erroneous requirement that the economic interest be
offset by the emotional benefit injects uncertainty into the calculation.
4. The Avoidable-Consequences Doctrine Does Not Require Parents
To Mitigate Damages by Aborting or Placing the Child up for
Adoption
Proper application of basic tort principles does not require the
mitigation of child-rearing damages through abortion or giving the child
up for adoption. In McKernan, the court raised, but did not address, the
possibility that such mitigation might be required.195 The avoidable-
consequences doctrine requires that only reasonable efforts be made to
mitigate damages.' 96 The McKernan court correctly noted that courts
have held abortion and adoption to be unreasonable means of reducing
child-rearing damages.' 97 Further, avoidance of consequences does not
190. See id. at 419, 687 P.2d at 855.
191. See, e.g., Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429,436 (Md. 1984).
192. See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. 1990).
193. See Lino, supra note 185, at 15-20.
194. Although the court does not allow ordinary child-rearing damages in wrongful birth, and the
issue is undecided in wrongful adoption, a denial in those cases is not necessarily less than full
compensation. Where the parents sought a healthy pregnancy or adopted child and the
accompanying expense, they are only damaged to the extent of extraordinary expenses.
195. See McKeman v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,417, 687 P.2d 850, 854 (1984).
196. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 (1979).




require that plaintiffs take action that is painful in a different way in
order to mitigate damages.198 Quite possibly, parents chose sterilization
as a means of birth control, rather than theoretically less effective
measures, because to them, terminating a future pregnancy or giving a
child up for adoption would be pain of a different type. Proper
application of tort principles, including offsetting benefit from harm to
the same interest and requiring reasonable mitigation, allows recovery of
child-rearing damages in wrongful pregnancy cases.
B. The McKernan Court Denied Child-Rearing Damages Based on
Fears of Emotional Harm that Are Meritless and Inconsistently
Applied in Torts Concerning Children
Close analysis of the McKernan court's fears of emotional harm or
disparagement of the child reveals that permitting recovery of child-
rearing damages is actually likely to benefit the child emotionally as well
as materially. Emotional harm to the child is not considered in wrongful
birth or wrongful adoption cases. Likewise, no rational basis justifies
using fear of emotional harm to the child to deny child-rearing damages
in wrongful pregnancy cases.
1. The Emotional Harm to the Child Will Be No Greater If Child-
Rearing Damages Are Allowed
It is specious to assert that the denial of child-rearing damages in a
wrongful pregnancy suit provides protection of the child's psyche where
other pregnancy and childbirth damages are allowed. Even where only
pregnancy-related damages are allowed, proof of liability is logically the
same: plaintiffs must introduce evidence that the child was unwanted,
that the parents sought to exercise their right to prevent future
pregnancies by choosing sterilization, and that the physician negligently
stymied the exercise of that right resulting in the child's birth.' 99 That the
child was initially unwanted is the basis of any wrongful pregnancy
action, whatever the measure of damages allowed. The child could learn
that he or she was initially unwanted whether or not the parent-plaintiffs
recover child-rearing costs. Instead of protection, the denial of recovery
1229
198. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part I.A.
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could have the opposite result-the child may feel less accepted if the
parents must bear the very costs they went to great lengths to avoid.
2. The Child Is Less Likely To Suffer Emotional Harm If Full
Recovery Is Permitted
A child whose parents sued for child-rearing expenses would not
suffer any more emotional trauma than other children who learn they
were initially unplanned."' After all, the parents will have chosen to
raise the child and will not have sought to have an abortion or to put the
child up for adoption. The child will likely understand that the parents
sued because they needed financial assistance and not because the child
was an unwanted burden. 20' To know that the financial strain the family
might have experienced was eased and that his or her presence actually
contributed to the overall welfare of the family could conceivably
provide a measure of comfort to the child.202
Finally, the court's fear that the child will be disparaged if child-
rearing damages are available is only a consideration for jurisdictions
following the benefits rule, not for jurisdictions allowing full recovery. 3
Full recovery would eliminate any temptation or need for parents to
disparage their child in court because the parents would be free to
acknowledge the worth of their child while stressing the financial deficit
created by costs of raising him or her.
3. The Court Fears Potential Emotional Harm to the Subject Child
Only in Wrongful Pregnancy Actions
The Supreme Court of Washington considers potential harm to the
child only when denying child-rearing damages in wrongful pregnancy
200. See Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (noting emotional injury
to child in wrongful pregnancy context not greater than other circumstances resulting in unplanned
birth).
201. See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. 1990).
202. See id. ("Relieving the family of the economic costs of raising the child may well add to the
emotional well-being of the entire family, including this child, rather than bring damage to it."); see
also Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Mass. 1990).
203. See McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 420, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (1984) (noting




actions.2"' A child with a physical defect but full mental faculties is
equally likely to discover his or her parents sued to recover the
extraordinary expenses associated with the defect. The court, however,
has expressed no concern about potential emotional harm to a child who
is the subject of a wrongful birth action where, in order to recover, the
parents must allege they would have prevented the pregnancy or aborted
the child had they known it would be born defective.0 5 Despite warnings
from commentators about emotional harm to the child,206 the court raised
no such concerns in 1998 when it allowed a cause of action for wrongful
adoption, even though the parents must allege that had they known of the
child's defects they would not have adopted him or her. 7 and the
potential remedy is revoking the adoption.0 8 This indifference toward an
adoptee's emotional health exists even though in a wrongful adoption
action it is possible that the child will be old enough to be aware of an
ongoing suit and of having been given up by its biological parents. The
court's inconsistent consideration of potential emotional harm to children
in wrongful pregnancy suits implies that only normal, healthy children
warrant emotional protection by the court.09 The court should not
assume the parent's role as protector of the child's emotional health, but
rather, should provide legal remedies for legal wrongs and fully
compensate parents for the tortious conduct.
C. Prevailing Legal Standards and Public Policy No Longer Support
the McKernan Decision
The McKernan court abandoned standard tort principles when denying
child-rearing damages in an apparent attempt to express appreciation for
life. Ironically, the denial of child-rearing costs may encourage abortions
among financially distressed parents. The emotion-based public policy
204. See supra Parts Ill.B-D. In addition to child-related torts, courts reviewing paternity lawsuits
do not consider potential emotional harm to children born out of wedlock, even though there the
child may one day discover that his or her mother hailed the child's own father into court to receive
assistance with child-rearing costs. See generally Linda D. v. Fritz C., 38 Wash. App. 288, 687 P.2d
223 (1984). There, however, initials are used to protect the child's identity. See id.
205. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
206. See Blair, supra note 153 and accompanying text.
207. See McKinney v. State, 134 Wash. 2d 388, 406, 950 P.2d 461,470-71 (1998).
208. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
209. If the court is truly concerned about preventing harm to the child, it could allow the child to
reap the financial benefits of child-rearing damages and use initials in the case caption, as in
paternity suits, to protect the child's privacy. See supra note 204.
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rationale in McKernan cannot stand in light of the declaration by
Washington voters that reproductive rights are fundamental.
1. The Decision Whether To Allow Child-Rearing Damages Should Be
Made According to Legal Standards Rather Than Emotional
Public-Policy Considerations
The McKernan court should have followed the admonition of the U.S.
Supreme Court and made its decision according to legal standards-
traditional tort principles of compensation and deterrence-rather than
being swayed by dubious emotional considerations.2" ' The McKernan
court denied child-rearing damages based on moral considerations,
claiming that allowing such damages "'meddles with the concept of life
and the stability of the family unit.""'2 " The court's determination that
allowing full child-rearing damages is unacceptable because a child is
more than an "economic liability 2t 2 is akin to the notion that any
pregnancy should be welcomed, regardless of how difficult it may be for
parents to provide for the child.23 The U.S. Supreme Court has
recommended that judicial decisions concerning contraception be made
according to legal standards, "free of emotion" and "predilection. 2 4
Denying child-rearing damages based on the court's predilection
regarding life and family values impairs parents' constitutionally
protected privacy by failing to provide an effective remedy for
sterilization malpractice.
2. The Decision To Deny Child-Rearing Damages May Encourage
Abortions
Whatever the court's actual predilection regarding the value of life,
the court's failure to award child-rearing costs may encourage, or even
force, parents to choose abortion. Economically overextended parents
faced with an unwanted pregnancy and no potential financial assistance
210. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
211. McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,421,687 P.2d 850, 856 (1984) (quoting Wilbur v.
Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982)).
212. Id. at 419, 687 P.2d at 854.
213. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992); see also supra note 35 and
accompanying text.




through recovery of child-rearing damages may find themselves
considering two choices: adoption or abortion.211 Many parents may fear
they would be unable to put the child up for adoption after the mother
has carried the child to term.216 The court's denial of child-rearing costs
may force parents unable to afford to raise the child to choose the
cheaper alternative of abortion rather than going through with the
pregnancy." 7 The Washington court's decision to deny child-rearing
costs because a child is "more than an economic liability '218 may have
been meant to encourage the sentiment that it will always be worth it to
give birth and to promote reverence for the human life. Although this
rationale reflects pro-life values, the decision may actually encourage the
abortion alternative.2 '9 Therefore, the decision to deny child-rearing
damages may actually contravene the public policy it attempts to further.
3. The Public Policy Cited in McKernan Conflicts with the
Washington Public Policy that the Right to Reproductive Choice Is
Fundamental
The public-policy basis of the decision denying child-rearing damages
in McKernan conflicts with current Washington public policy as adopted
through Initiative 120.' 0 This initiative, passed seven years after the
McKernan decision, declared that the public policy of Washington state
respects reproductive rights as fundamental. The judiciary, when
determining public policy, must first look to relevant statutory
provisions.22" ' The McKernan decision elevated the speculative emotional
harm to the child above providing judicial protection from negligent
interference with parents' fundamental right of reproductive choice. The
public-policy notions that predicated the denial of child-rearing expenses
are outmoded since the passage of Initiative 120.
215. See Michael H. Knight, Note, Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland: A Misapplied
Public Policy, 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 153, 166-67 (1990).
216. See id. at 167.
217. See id. at 167-68.
218. McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 419, 687 P.2d 850, 854 (1984).
219. See Knight, supra note 215, at 166-67.
220. See supra Part I.B.
221. See Cary v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 Wash. 2d 335, 340, 922 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1996).
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D. The Failure to Allow Recovery of Child-Rearing Costs in Wrongful
Pregnancy Actions Effectively Immunizes Physicians from Liability
and Leaves Victims Inadequately Compensated
By denying child-rearing costs, which are the substantial portion of a
potential damage award, the court has effectively eliminated the
incentive for attorneys to pursue wrongful pregnancy claims. Costs of a
routine pregnancy and childbirth are $8,000 or less.222 The estimated cost
of bringing a wrongful pregnancy claim is at least $20,000, excluding
attorney fees.223 Because neither significant permanent physical injury
nor recovery of ongoing special damages is associated with the birth of a
healthy child,224 plaintiffs' attorneys are reluctant to pursue wrongful
pregnancy claims. Indeed, the leading treatise on Washington tort
litigation implies that no cause of action exists for wrongful pregnancy of
a healthy child.225
The potential of only minimal damages in pursued claims and the
resulting disincentive for attorneys to pursue lawsuits effectively
immunizes physicians from liability, resulting in little deterrence of
malpractice and inadequate compensation for parents. Even if a plaintiff
brings a successful claim for limited damages, the physician responsible
for the negligent sterilization has little to fear where the parents must
bear the major cost of the tortious conduct-rearing the unplanned child,
estimated at up to $350,000.226 Judicial recognition of a legal injury
without provision for an effective remedy is contrary to the central
principles of tort law. A guiding principle of torts is to make the victim
as whole as possible through compensation. 227 Absent awards for child-
rearing costs, plaintiffs in wrongful pregnancy suits are either woefully
undercompensated or unable to bring a lawsuit, which results in no
recovery for the physician's negligence.
222. Health Insurance Association of America, Source Book of Health Insurance Data 1999-
2000, at 115 tbl. 5.12 (1999) (reporting costs of hospital stay and physician charge for
uncomplicated vaginal delivery in Washington as $7,210).
223. See Telephone Interview with Mark A. Johnson, supra note 60 and accompanying text.
224. See id.
225. See 16 Washington Practice § 4.25, at 91 (citing McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,
687 P.2d 850 (1984)) ("Washington recognizes a cause of action for wrongful birth, but only where
the child is other than a normal, healthy child.").
226. See Lino, supra note 185, at 11.




V. FULL RECOVERY OF CHILD-REARING EXPENSES IS
NECESSARY TO VINDICATE A CONSTITUTIONALLY AND
STATUTORILY PROTECTED FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
A right is only as valuable as the remedy available to vindicate it. The
Supreme Court of Washington has previously recognized constitutional
reproductive rights and the correlative duties of health-care providers to
provide due care to honor those rights, as well as the relationship
between tort remedies and malpractice deterrence.228 The choice to
prevent future pregnancies through sterilization is the same exercise of
reproductive choice involved in abortion, and probably a more palatable
alternative to many. Just as legislative restrictions on contraceptives and
abortion impairs the exercise of a constitutional right,229 so does the
virtual judicial protection afforded physicians who negligently perform
sterilizations. Whether the legislature denies access to abortions and
contraceptives or the judiciary refuses to provide the legal framework
necessary to assure that choosing to prevent future pregnancies through
sterilization is effective, the result is the same: the constitutional and
statutorily protected right to prevent unwanted pregnancies is impaired.
The U.S. Supreme Court and Washington voters have elevated the right
to prevent pregnancies to the highest status as a fundamental right. A
right held in such esteem deserves fundamental protection by way of a
meaningful tort recovery for the interference with that right. The court
must structure a legal remedy for negligent sterilization in a manner that
assures physician accountability and fully vindicates the right to
reproductive choice that is protected as fundamental under both state and
federal law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Washington's policy denying recovery of
child-rearing damages for wrongful pregnancy is based on a
misconceived application of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 920
and questionable fear of emotional harm to the child. The court should
apply section 920 as it does in other torts concerning children and require
a benefits offset only to the same interest that is harmed. The court also
should not consider what may be an irrational fear of emotional harm to
228. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460,472-73, 656 P.2d 483, 491 (1983).
229. See Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689-90 (1977).
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the unplanned child, but should concern itself with providing legal
remedies for legal wrongs, as it has done more recently when creating a
wrongful adoption cause of action.
The public-policy decision to deny full recovery of child-rearing
damages is apparently based on emotional considerations with a
decidedly pro-life ring to them. Judicial decisions should be made
according to legal standards, notwithstanding the court's predilection
regarding reproductive rights. Ironically, the court's articulated public
policy may actually encourage abortions rather than perpetuate a
reverence for life.
Finally, the denial of child-rearing damages cannot be reconciled with
the fundamental nature of reproductive rights. The choice to have or not
to have children is one of the most personal, intimate, and important
decisions a person makes in his or her lifetime and is so esteemed that it
is given fundamental status by both the U.S. Constitution and
Washington law.23' The denial of child-rearing damages for wrongful
pregnancy contravenes this fundamental status and the basic purposes of
tort recovery-compensation and deterrence-by placing the entire
burden of physician negligence on parents and providing little incentive
for attorneys to bring wrongful pregnancy cases. The duty to use due
care by physicians performing sterilization procedures undertaken by
parents exercising their reproductive rights should not be effectively
nullified by judicial notions of public policy. Child-rearing damages are
a necessary tort remedy to fully vindicate fundamental reproductive
rights impaired by physician negligence.
230. See supra Parts I.A.-B.
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